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WHEN NOTHING IS SHOCKING: THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DEGRADES THE OUTRAGEOUS GOVERNMENT
CONDUCT DEFENSE
-UNITED STATES PENITENTIARY, LOMPOC, CAL.-
In an October 22, 1983, escape attempt that left one inmate
dead and ended in a serious collision with security roadblocks
and the rearrest of the surviving escapees, six federal prisoners
drove a prison garbage truck through a fence here, amid heavy
gunfire from guard towers. I
The surviving inmates, prosecuted in federal district court in
Los Angeles for the escape, filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the
indictment on grounds of outrageous government conduct.2
Their motion, which failed, alleged that prison officials knew in
advance of the escape plan, and "encouraged or assisted in" the
escape. 3
The inmates appealed the denial of their motion to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, again al-
leging that prison officials had been aware of and had en-
couraged the escape plan for several months prior to the plan's
execution.4 The Ninth Circuit upheld the denial of the motion,
agreeing with the district court that despite the possible truth of
the prisoners' allegations, the government's conduct 'fell fatally
short' of the kind.., required to sustain the outrageous govern-
ment conduct defense. "5 The appellate court's ruling came de-
spite allegations by the inmates that during the months preceding
the escape, prison officials removed one of the escapees from mess
hall duty in order to prevent his gaining access to the garbage
truck but later reassigned him to that same duty. 6
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies regularly conduct
1. United States v. Williams, 791 F.2d 1383, 1385-87 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869
(1986).
2. Id.
3. Id. (citing findings of district court).
4. Id.
5. Id. (quoting findings of district court).
6. Id. The inmates alleged that other than the temporary work reassignment, prison offi-
cials did nothing else to prevent the escape. Id.
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undercover investigations designed to expose suspected criminal offend-
ers and their operations. These undercover operations have been judi-
cially approved as legitimate law enforcement techniques.7 Judicial
approval of undercover law enforcement operations raises questions as to
the parameters of acceptable conduct by undercover law enforcement
agents, and whether certain investigative tactics unconstitutionally vio-
late suspects' rights to due process of law.8
Typically, federal courts in criminal cases consider the issue of
whether government agents violated a defendant's due process rights
during any preceding undercover investigation. 9 In these cases, defend-
7. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 557 (1976) (citing United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973), Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 208-09 (1966)). The Weather-
ford Court observed: "Our cases... have recognized the... necessity of undercover work and
the value it often is to effective law enforcement." Id.
8. The right to not be deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"
is guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution. U.S. CONsT.
amend. V and XIV. The fifth amendment guarantees protection against federal government
action, and the fourteenth amendment uses similar language to protect individuals from state
government action. Id See also W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.2, at
58-60 (1984). As a general rule, the fourteenth amendment's due process clause "incorpo-
rates" federal constitutional protections into state law, such that state governments must af-
ford at least as much constitutional protection to individuals as would the federal government
under the same circumstances. Id
Professors LaFave and Israel note that a subject of continual debate by the Supreme
Court is "the extent to which the Fourteenth Amendment imposes upon the states prohibitions
identical or similar to those imposed upon the federal government by the Bill of Rights." Id.
at 59-60. However, Professor Tribe points out that the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause protects-and thus state governments must comply with minimal federal constitutional
standards regarding-
the right to just compensation; the first amendment freedoms of speech, press, assem-
bly, petition, free exercise of religion, and non-establishment of religion; the fourth
amendment rights to be free of unreasonable search and seizure and to exclude from
criminal trials evidence illegally seized; the fifth amendment rights to be free of com-
pelled self-incrimination and double jeopardy; the sixth amendment rights to counsel,
to a speedy and public trial before a jury, to an opportunity to confront opposing
witnesses, and to compulsory process for the purpose of obtaining favorable wit-
nesses; and the eighth amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11-2, at 772-73 (2d ed. 1988) (citations omit-
ted).
Thus, with regard to protections afforded individuals subject to undercover law enforce-
ment investigations, a suspect's due process rights against federal government action flow di-
rectly from the fifth amendment, while protection from state government action flows from the
fifth amendment as applied to the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra, at 58-60. This Comment focuses on federal under-
cover investigations, and therefore is primarily concerned with fifth amendment due process
rights.
9. For example, United States v. So, 755 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1985), involved a federal
undercover investigation into money laundering. Id. at 1352. The defendant later alleged that
the government's investigative conduct violated his due process rights. Id. at 1353.
However, federal courts have also considered the issue of whether government conduct
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ants ask courts to determine whether law enforcement authorities acted
unconscionably during the operation. When a defendant asks a federal
court to consider this issue, the defendant is invoking the "outrageous
government conduct" defense." The defendant asserts that the conduct
of government agents during the investigation that led to his arrest was
"conduct that shocks the conscience" and it therefore violated his due
process rights."
Prior to the Supreme Court of the United States' recognizing the
outrageous government conduct defense in United States v. Russell, 2 the
Ninth Circuit twice overturned convictions on grounds analogous to out-
rageous government conduct. 3 Since then, however, the Ninth Circuit
has not honored a defense motion based on outrageous government con-
duct. 4 The Ninth Circuit has done more than narrowly apply the con-
stitutional standard; the court's record suggests that the Ninth Circuit is
ignoring the law and allowing the government to trample on the constitu-
tional rights of the criminally accused.'
5
This Comment analyzes the Ninth Circuit's treatment of the outra-
geous government conduct defense in cases preceded by undercover in-
violated due process protections, in the absence of a preceding undercover investigation.
Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968), involved due process issues surround-
ing an unconsented rectal cavity search of the defendant by government agents, and no under-
cover activity had occurred.
10. United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1432 n. 1 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds
sub nor. United States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1986). Bogart involved interstate
real estate fraud. Id. at 1429-30.
11. Id.
12. 411 U.S. 423 (1973). For a discussion of Russell, see infra notes 152-88 and accompa-
nying text.
13. Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971). Greene involved government
initiation of an illegal liquor bootlegging operation. Id. at 784-86. See also Huguez v. United
States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968). That case involved an involuntary rectal cavity search,
conducted when defendant fell under suspicion of smuggling narcotics into the United States
from Mexico. Id at 367.
14. In fact, a federal court of appeals has honored a defense motion based on outrageous
government conduct only once since 1971. See United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir.
1978). Twigg involved government investigation into a methampetamine hydrochloride
("speed") manufacturing ring. Id at 373-74.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1987) (motion to dismiss
granted by district court and reversed, with indictment reinstated, by Ninth Circuit), cert
denied, 108 S. Ct. 233 (1988) (see also infra notes 346-80 and accompanying text); United
States v. Tavelman, 655 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 1981) (conviction aff'd), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939
(1982) (see also infra notes 274-301 and accompanying text); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d
876 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (motion to dismiss granted by district court and reversed, with indict-
ment reinstated, by Ninth Circuit), cert denied, 449 U.S. 903 (1980) (see also infra notes 302-
21 and accompanying text); United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1977)
(conviction aff'd), cert denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978) (see also infra notes 322-45 and accompa-
nying text).
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vestigation. It will demonstrate that the court has interpreted the
constitutional standard much too narrowly. The Comment is divided
into four parts: First, the outrageous government conduct defense is ex-
plained in detail; second, the Comment explores the origin of the defense
in the Supreme Court; third, the Comment surveys Ninth Circuit case
law regarding outrageous government conduct; and finally, the Comment
sets forth a method for ensuring the defense's proper enforcement. The
Comment also proposes congressional legislation aimed at creating a
statutory outrageous government conduct defense.
II. Two DEFENSES TO FEDERAL UNDERCOVER GOVERNMENT
ACTIvITY: THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE AND THE
OUTRAGEOUS GOVERNMENT CONDUCT DEFENSE
In order to understand the outrageous government conduct defense,
it is necessary to review a closely related defense--entrapment. 16 A
study of entrapment is important, as the outrageous government conduct




The government "entraps" a defendant when a government agent,
"for the purpose of obtaining evidence of a crime... originates the idea
of the crime and then induces another person to engage in conduct con-
stituting such a crime when the other person is not otherwise [mentally]
disposed to do so."" The defense of entrapment focuses on the defend-
ant's state of mind; a defendant must show that but for inducement by
16. For a full discussion of the federal entrapment defense, see infra notes 18-80 and ac-
companying text. While this Comment focuses on the federal entrapment defense, it should be
noted that the defense is also recognized by state courts. Some states do not focus on whether
a defendant is predisposed to commit the crime. For example, California courts test for en-
trapment by examining whether "the conduct of the law enforcement agent [was] likely to
induce a normally law-abiding person to commit the offense." People. v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d
675, 689-90, 591 P.2d 947, 955, 153 Cal. Rptr. 459, 467 (1979).
17. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Justice Frankfurter stated that "[t]he crucial question.., to which the court must direct itself
is whether the police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below standards... for the
proper use of governmental power." Id (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter
also suggested that "a test that looks to the character and predisposition of the defendant
rather than the conduct of the police loses sight of the underlying reason for the defense of
entrapment." Id (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also infra notes 132-51 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the concurring opinion in Sherman, and the concurrence's role in
developing the outrageous government conduct defense.
18. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 48, at 36 (1972).
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the government, the defendant would not have committed the crime.19
The successful entrapment defense will demonstrate that "the Govern-
ment's deception... implant[ed] the criminal design in the mind of the
defendant.""0
The defense of entrapment is rooted in two Supreme Court deci-
sions, Sorrells v. United States2 and Sherman v. United States.2" Sorrells
arose out of an arrest for possession and sale of whiskey in violation of
the since-repealed National Prohibition Act. 3 Prior to Sorrells' arrest,
an undercover federal prohibition agent, posing as a tourist and accom-
panied by three of Sorrells' friends, went to the defendant's home.24
During the next few hours, the agent initiated conversation about liquor
and repeatedly asked Sorrells if he could obtain liquor for the agent.25
Sorrells refused these requests.26 Soon, the topic of conversation turned
to the war experiences of Sorrells, the agent and Jones (one of the defend-
ant's visiting friends), all of whom had served together in the military
during World War 1.27 After this conversation, the agent again asked
Sorrells to get liquor for him." This time, Sorrells left the house and
returned with whiskey.29
At trial, Sorrells attempted to raise the entrapment defense, but the
trial judge refused to allow the jury to consider the issue.3" The convic-
tion was affirmed on appeal,3 and the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari.32 In an opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, the Court reversed the
conviction and held that the trial court erroneously prohibited the jury
from considering the entrapment issue; the Court stated that the defend-
ant "was an industrious and law-abiding citizen, and that the agent lured
the defendant, otherwise innocent, to [the offense's] commission" by
making repeated requests and by taking advantage of Sorrells' emotional
19. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973). For an excellent discussion of both
defenses, see Note, The Need for a Dual Approach to Entrapment, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 199
(1981).
20. Russell, 411 U.S. at 436.
21. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
22. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
23. 27 U.S.C. § 1 (1919) (repealed 1935).
24. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 439.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 439-41. The three had served in the same combat unit. Ia at 439.
28. Id. at 439-41.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 438.
31. Sorrells v. United States, 57 F.2d 973 (4th Cir.), rev'd, 287 U.S. 430 (1932).
32. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 439.
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vulnerability to wartime memories.33 The Court reasoned that Congress
did not intend the National Prohibition Act to prompt punishment of
defendants whose illegal behavior had been entirely induced by the gov-
ernment.34 The Court determined that Sorrells should have been given
the opportunity to present an entrapment defense for consideration by
the trier of fact.3 The Court's decision established that the entrapment
defense is available to any defendant "otherwise innocent whom the Gov-
ernment is seeking to punish for an alleged offense which is the product
of the creative activity of its own officials."
36
The Supreme Court's next major decision on the entrapment defense
was handed down in Sherman v. United States.37  In Sherman,
Kalchinian, the government's unpaid informant, approached the defend-
ant at a doctor's office where both were being treated for drug addic-
tion.38 During subsequent unplanned meetings, Kalchinian made many
requests that Sherman get drugs for him, but Sherman consistently re-
fused. 39 Kalchinian persisted, at one point attempting to invoke Sher-
man's sympathy and getting Sherman to renew his own drug habit.4"
Eventually, Sherman acceded to the requests and sold drugs on several
occasions to Kalchinian.4 1 Federal narcotics agents observed the last
three of the sales, and on that basis, arrested Sherman.42
At trial,43 Sherman unsuccessfully raised the defense of entrap-
ment,' and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. 5 The Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals' ruling and remanded the case to the dis-
trict court with instructions to dismiss the indictment.46 Chief Justice
Warren, writing for the Court, concluded that entrapment had been es-
33. Id. at 441. The Court expressed anger at the attempt by the government agent to
arouse sentiments among the "companions in arms." Id.
34. Id. at 448.
35. Id. at 452.
36. Id. at 451.
37. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
38. Id. at 371.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 373. At various times, Kalchinian told Sherman of his own experiences as a
drug abuser. Id'
41. Id.
42. Id. at 371.
43. Sherman was tried twice. Id. at 370. After being convicted at the first trial, he ap-
pealed and the conviction was reversed. Id. (citing United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880 (2d
Cir. 1952)). Upon retrial, he was again convicted. Id. at 372. His final appeal arrived at the
Supreme Court by way of his conviction on retrial. Id.
44. Id. at 372.
45. United States v. Sherman, 240 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1957), rev'd, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
46. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 378.
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tablished as a matter of law.47 The Court found it "patently clear that
[Sherman] was induced by Kalchinian, ' '48 and sharply disagreed with the
government's contention that Sherman was predisposed to commit the
charged offense.4 9
In addition to reaffirming Sorrells' recognition of entrapment as a
valid defense to a federal criminal prosecution, 0 the Sherman Court re-
solved two other issues arising in entrapment cases. First, the Court
pronounced that entrapment is a factual issue "unless [it] can be decided
as a matter of law."5" In support of its pronouncement, the Court noted
that the federal courts of appeals generally reserved the entrapment issue
for the trier of fact.5 2 The Court thereby implied that in general, entrap-
ment should continue to be treated as a factual issue. Also, the Court's
disposition of the case53 indicates that in the event that any court found
entrapment as a matter of law, a defendant's remedy would be to have
the indictment dismissed. 4
Second, Sherman stands for the proposition that when the govern-
ment uses an informant to help apprehend a suspect, the government
must control the informant's undercover activities and bear responsibil-
ity for the informant's mistakes or misbehavior. In Sherman, Kalchinian
illegally induced the defendant to commit the crime.5 The defendant
argued that because Kalchinian was its informant, the government had
to suffer the consequences of the illegal inducement. 6 The Court agreed,
holding that "the Government cannot disown Kalchinian and insist it is
not responsible for his actions."5 7 Also, in criticizing the government's
failure to adequately monitor Kalchinian's activities,58 the Court pro-
claimed that "the Government cannot make such use of an informant
and then claim disassociation [from the informant's actions] through
47. Id. at 373.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 375.
50. Id. at 372. The Sherman Court referred to Sorrells as the case in which it "firmly
recognized the defense of entrapment in the federal courts." Id. (citing Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932)).
51. Id. at 377.
52. Id. at 377 n.8.
53. Id. at 378.
54. Id
55. Id. at 373.
56. Id. at 375-76.
57. Id. at 373.
58. Id. at 374. The Court remarked that "the federal agent in charge of the case admitted
that he never bothered to question Kalchinian about the way he had made contact with [Sher-
man]." Id at 374-75.
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ignorance. ' 5 9
This aspect of the Court's opinion had implications not only for en-
trapment cases, but for all cases in which government informants' under-
cover encounters with suspects violated constitutional or legal standards.
Sherman established that where an informant's activities violated the
rights of an accused, the government would lose the benefit of the in-
formant's contact with the subject, or a court might dismiss the case
altogether."
B. Entrapment and the Outrageous Government
Conduct Defense, Contrasted
The entrapment defense61 and the outrageous government conduct
defense are similar in that they are both invoked to contest the legality of
undercover government conduct.62 However, there are significant differ-
ences between them. First, they differ procedurally. Entrapment is an
affirmative defense, presented at trial.63 Technically, the outrageous gov-
ernment conduct defense is not a "defense" at all. Rather, as Judge
Pregerson observed in United States v. Bogart,64 a defendant usually
makes the claim in a pretrial motion, and "if successful... [the motion]
results in the dismissal of the indictment whatever [the indictment's]
merits. '6 The defense may also be raised as a post-conviction remedy.
Another difference between the defenses is that they attach different
degrees of importance to the defendant's mental state at the time of the
crime. Entrapment focuses on the defendant's lack of mental predisposi-
tion to commit the offense;66 the outrageous government conduct defense
focuses solely on the nature and legality of the government's conduct
59. Id. at 375.
60. Id. at 378.
61. See supra notes 18-60 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the entrap-
ment defense.
62. For a full discussion of Supreme Court cases on entrapment, see Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) (see also supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text); Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958) (see also supra notes 37-60 and accompanying text). For an
example of usage of the outrageous government conduct defense to contest the legality of
undercover governmental activity, see, e.g., United States v. Ryan, 548 F.2d 782 (9th Cir.
1976) (outrageous government conduct defense raised to contest government investigation of
corruption on Clark County, Nevada, Board of Commissioners), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 965
(1977).
63. See United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1432 n.1 (9th Cir.), vacated on other
grounds sub nor. United States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1986).
64. 783 F.2d at 1432 n.1 (citing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973)).




during the investigation.67 Under the outrageous government conduct
defense, the defendant's mental culpability is therefore completely irrele-
vant to a determination of whether the government's conduct in a partic-
ular case rose to the level of outrageousness. 68 Thus, while only a non-
predisposed defendant may successfully claim entrapment, any defend-
ant, predisposed to commit the crime or not, may invoke the outrageous
government conduct defense.69
1. Foundation
The two defenses also differ in legal foundation. The defenses draw
on different notions or doctrines in the law for prohibiting certain con-
duct by law enforcement officers. On the one hand, the Sorrells Court
found that on the issue of entrapment, inducing a non-predisposed indi-
vidual to commit the crime with which he or she would later be charged
was "unconscionable [and] contrary to public policy.., and to the estab-
lished law of the land."70 The Court did not cite the United States Con-
stitution, nor did it refer to specific cases or general common-law
doctrines to support its decision. The Court did refer back to the Na-
tional Prohibition Act, the statute at issue in the case, and noted that
prosecution of a non-predisposed individual was contrary to the intent
and spirit of the legislation. 71 For the most part, however, the Court
relied on a general perception of long adhered-to values and policies, and
concluded that the governmental conduct at issue did not comport with
American legal and moral traditions.72
The outrageous government conduct defense, on the other hand, has
a legal foundation more tangible than that of entrapment. It is based on
the due process clause of the fifth amendment of the Constitution.73 A
defendant claiming outrageous government conduct seeks to convince a
67. Id. See also Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 497 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
68. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1436 n.l.
69. See United States v. McQuin, 612 F.2d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir.) (quoting United States v.
Gonzales-Benitez, 537 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir.) ("[Ihe Supreme Court left open the possi-
bility that the conviction of a predisposed defendant may be reversed where the government
[conduct] reached such an outrageous level as to violate due process."), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
923 (1976), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 955 (1980)).
70. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 444 (1932).
71. Id. at 448.
72. Id. at 444-45.
73. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973) (citing Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952), Kinsella v. United States ex rel Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960)). The fifth
amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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federal court that the government's behavior during the investigation vio-
lated the defendant's fifth amendment due process rights, and that prose-
cution should therefore be precluded or the conviction nullified. 74
2. Justification
The defenses have developed to address different concerns. The en-
trapment defense exists because the Supreme Court recognized that it
would be unfair to prosecute a defendant for a crime whose commission
was totally induced by the government.75 The Sorrells Court drew a line
between using "artifice and stratagem... to catch those engaged in crim-
inal enterprises ' 76 and allowing the government to "catch" someone
whom the government, but for its own activity, would not have had rea-
son to arrest." The Sorrells decision and the existence of the entrapment
defense reflect basic notions of justice and fairness under law, and help
define acceptable standards for undercover government conduct.7" Addi-
tionally, the entrapment defense serves to reaffirm our society's goal of
punishing only those defendants who committed the criminal act and
who were mentally culpable.79 Within the defense is the notion that pun-
ishing a person who possessed the mens rea only from the moment the
government gave it to him or her would subvert the centuries-old prac-
tice of punishing only the independently culpable.8"
Unlike the entrapment defense, an argument for the existence of the
outrageous government conduct defense cannot be made in terms of the
law's desire to protect non-predisposed defendants. This is because the
outrageous government conduct defense has nothing to do with the de-
fendant's mental state.8" The outrageous government conduct defense
focuses solely on the government's investigative conduct.8 2 The potential
result of finding outrageous government conduct is that a person who
might otherwise be found clearly predisposed will not be prosecuted or
punished. 3
Why does the law recognize the outrageous government conduct de-
74. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-72 (1952). The Rochin Court characterized
due process as a legal concept "not final and fixed," but as a set of "general considerations"
which the nation's courts must take into account during the judicial process. Id.
75. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442.
76. Id. at 441-42.
77. Id.
78. Id at 452.
79. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.4, at 212 (2d ed. 1986).
80. Id.
81. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 375-78 (1958).
82. Id
83. Bogart, 783 F.2d at 1432 n.1 (citing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973)).
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fense instead of giving law enforcement agencies free reign in undercover
investigations? The answer is that, as eager as society may be to control
crime, it will not tolerate crime's amelioration at the expense of a per-
son's due process rights.8 4 The outrageous government conduct defense
rests on the proposition that, although crime control is an important
goal, there are simply limits on how far the government may go in pursu-
ing that goal."5 The government goes beyond those limits when it vio-
lates "due process," or what Justice Frankfurter called the "summarized
guarantee of respect for... personal immunities" from the government,
which the individual enjoys.86 Justice Cardozo characterized due process
rights as "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental"8" or "implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty."88 The outrageous government conduct defense exists to protect
these rights, by allowing courts to act to contain abuse of official power.8 9
The defense is important even beyond the courtroom in which it is
raised. Justice Frankfurter stated that it is inextricably bound up with
the "most comprehensive protection of [our] liberties, the Due Process
Clause."90 For this reason, adequate or overly narrow application of the
defense affects the quantum of liberty enjoyed by the defendant raising
the defense, and potentially by every person in this country.
III. THE OUTRAGEOUS GOVERNMENT CONDUCT DEFENSE'S ORIGIN
IN THE SUPREME COURT
Before discussing the Ninth Circuit's treatment of the outrageous
government conduct defense, it is important to examine the evolution of
the doctrine in the Supreme Court of the United States. Two Supreme
Court decisions laid the foundation for later cases in which the Supreme
Court devoted the bulk of its attention to the outrageous government
84. Professors LaFave and Scott, for example, discuss the "constitutional limitation on the
boundaries of the police power." W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTt, supra note 79, § 2.12, at 148. For
a general discussion of this area, see id, §§ 2.1-2.15.
85. See id. § 5.2, at 430-32.
86. See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169.
87. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), rev'd, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964).
88. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), rev'd, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968).
89. Id at 175 (Black, J., concurring). Though Justice Black referred specifically to the
Rochin majority's opinion as it applied to the states, his words offer insight into the purpose of
a due process-based defense to a federal criminal prosecution: "The Due Process Clause em-
powers [courts] to nullify any.., law if its application 'shocks the conscience,' 'offends a sense
of justice,' or runs counter to the 'decencies of civilized conduct."' Id
90. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 170.
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conduct defense.9
Prior to recognition of the outrageous government conduct defense
in United States v. Russell,92 members of the Court had argued that in
some criminal prosecutions judicial attention should focus solely on the
government's investigative conduct. 93 The majority opinion in Rochin v.
California,94 and the concurring opinion in Sherman v. United States"
advanced that position. In Rochin, the Court reversed a conviction on
grounds that government investigative conduct violated the defendant's
due process rights.96 The Court, however, was careful to limit the hold-
ing and its new remedy to the facts of that case.97 In contrast, the con-
curring opinion of Sherman did not propose reversing the defendant's
conviction or dismissing the indictment on due process grounds;98 rather,
it suggested that federal courts should routinely be receptive to the due
process argument. 99 Critical analysis of these earlier opinions facilitates
a more thorough understanding of the due process-based remedy.
A. Rochin v. California
The Supreme Court granted certiorari' 00 to hear Rochin v. Califor-
nia 101 following affirmance of the defendant's conviction by a California
appellate court.'0 2 The case arose when Los Angeles County Sheriff's
deputies were informed that Rochin was selling narcotics.0 3 After going
to the defendant's home to investigate, the officers found Rochin in his
bedroom, and also spotted two capsules on a nearby night stand."° Af-
ter brief interrogation concerning ownership of the capsules, Rochin
stuffed the capsules into his mouth, trying to swallow them.' 05 A strug-
91. These foundational decisions were Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 168 (1952). The concurrence
in Sherman is discussed in infra notes 128-50 and accompanying text, and Rochin is discussed
in infra notes 94-124 and accompanying text.
92. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
93. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Rochin, 342 U.S. at 168.
94. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
95. 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
96. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 174.
97. Id. See infra notes 100-30 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of Rochin.
98. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 385 (Frankfurter, 3., concurring).
99. Id. at 383 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
100. Rochin v. California, 341 U.S. 939 (1951).
101. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
102. People v. Rochin, 101 Cal. App. 2d 140, 143, 225 P.2d 1, 3 (1950). The California
Supreme Court denied Rochin's petition for a hearing. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 167.





gle ensued, during which the officers unsuccessfully attempted to prevent
Rochin from swallowing the capsules."°6 Rochin was arrested and hand-
cuffed, and the officers took him to a hospital where his stomach was
forcibly pumped.107 The officers picked out the suspect capsules, which
were found to contain morphine, from the vomitus. l'0
The question before the Supreme Court was whether the officers'
bursting into Rochin's bedroom, fighting to prevent Rochin's swallowing
the capsules and ordering his stomach pumped to obtain the capsules
violated Rochin's due process rights.0 9 The Court, in an opinion by Jus-
tice Frankfurter," 0 concluded that the events, as a whole, amounted to a
due process violation and reversed Rochin's conviction."'
Justice Frankfurter emphasized that although the Court should not
recklessly overturn state criminal convictions," 2 the Court must always
make sure that a conviction was obtained in accordance with due pro-
cess." 3 The Court defined "due process" as "a summarized constitu-
tional guarantee of respect for . . . personal immunities which are
'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' 11 Then,
the Court admonished that, in considering whether to overturn a state
court conviction on due process grounds, the high Court's decision must
not be read to be rooted in "fastidious squeamishness or private senti-
mentalism about combatting crime too energetically."" 5 The Court
stated that it would overturn a conviction only where the government's
investigative activities became "methods too close to the rack and the
screw" to be constitutional." 6 The Rochin Court, analyzing the depu-
ties' conduct in the case, found that their conduct "shocked the con-
science" and most definitely crossed the line into unconstitutional
territory." 17
At first glance, the Rochin opinion strongly suggests that the
106. Id.
107. Id. Rochin was administered an emetic to force him to vomit. Id
108. Id.
109. Id. at 168, 172.
110. Id. at 166. Justices Black and Douglas joined in the majority opinion. Id.
111. Id. at 174.
112. Id. at 168.
113. Id. at 169.
114. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), rev'd, Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), rev'd, Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)).
115. Id. at 172.
116. Id.
117. Id. The Court noted that "due process of law is heedless of the means by which other-
wise relevant and credible evidence is found." Id
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Supreme Court was encouraging criminal defendants to raise the due
process argument frequently and against a wide variety of government
conduct.' 1 8 After finding that Rochin's rights had been infringed, the
Court stated that analysis of due process issues could not rest on fixed
notions of what does or does not constitute acceptable government inves-
tigative conduct.1 9 The Court reasoned that the concept of due process
evolves as our society evolves, and that social change makes due process
unamenable to rigid definition. 120 The Court therefore refused to perma-
nently classify certain government investigative conduct as violative of
due process. 121 It offered for future reference only the general guideline
that "convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend 'a
sense of justice.' ,122
Three conclusions follow from the Court's reasoning: First, the is-
sue of whether government conduct violated due process rights is one
that needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis; 123 second, a wide
range of government investigative conduct might be open to challenge on
due process grounds; 24 and third, that Rochin was intended to be
broadly interpreted and far-reaching.1 25 These conclusions follow be-
cause of the Court's choice of words as to when convictions must be
overturned. The admonition that a conviction would be struck down if it
had been "brought about by methods that offend 'a sense of justice' 26
can be interpreted very broadly, for a 'sense of justice' is a broad, vague
concept. The language in Rochin opened the door to lawyers' arguments
that government conduct in any number of situations was conduct re-
quiring nullification of subsequent prosecutions or convictions.
The Court apparently anticipated, and disfavored, such broad inter-
pretation of its language. 127 It warned lawyers and lower courts to inter-
pret Rochin as applying only to the facts of that case. 28 Disapproval was
expressed over future "hypothetical situations conjured up, shading im-
118. Id. at 173.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 170-73.
121. Id. at 173 (quoting Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936)).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 169-74.
124. Id. at 173. The Court remarked, "[d]ue process of law, as a [sic] historic and genera-
tive principle, precludes defining." Id.
125. Id.
126. Id
127. Id. at 174.
128. Id. The Court also noted that "[i]n deciding this case we do not heedlessly bring into




perceptibly from the circumstances of this case and by gradations pro-
ducing practical differences despite seemingly logical extensions." 129
Given the Court's essentially fluid definition of due process, and un-
willingness to make enduring pronouncements on the constitutionality of
certain government investigative conduct," ° the concluding admonition
seems out of place. Restricting the holding to the case's facts may have
effectively stripped Rochin of precedential value. Rochin is, however,
only one-half of the pre-outrageous government conduct defense story.
The other half is the concurring opinion delivered in Sherman v. United
States.
131
B. Sherman v. United States
In Sherman v. United States,132 the Supreme Court found that the
defendant had not been mentally predisposed to sell narcotics to the gov-
ernment's informant, and that he had been induced to commit the
crime. 133 The Supreme Court therefore reversed the defendant's convic-
tion, on grounds that he had been entrapped. 134 The majority opinion in
Sherman did not discuss the government's conduct from a due process
perspective. However, Justice Frankfurter, who also wrote the majority
opinion in Rochin,135 discussed in a concurring opinion the defendant's
due process rights. 136 The concurrence revealed that several members of
the Court had wanted to expand the due process argument's applicability
as early as 1958.137 The concurring opinion also reflects Justice Frank-
furter's apparent dissatisfaction with the limited holding he had pro-
pounded only six years earlier in Rochin.
138
Justice Frankfurter found the due process argument to apply be-
yond the facts of Rochin: "The crucial question.., is whether the police
conduct revealed in the particular case falls below standards... for the
proper use of governmental power." 139 Justice Frankfurter and those
members joining him in his concurrence14° expressed displeasure over
129. Id.
130. Id. at 170-73.
131. 356 U.S. 369 (1958). The majority opinion in Sherman is discussed in the text accom-
panying supra notes 37-60.
132. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
133. Id at 373.
134. Id.
135. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
136. Id. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
137. Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
138. Id
139. Id.
140. Justices Douglas, Harlan and Brennan joined in the concurrence. Id
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the Court's continuing devotion to the issue of predisposition.'4 1 These
members criticized the majority's approach, stating that "[a] test that
looks to the character and predisposition of the defendant rather than
[to] the conduct of the police loses sight of the underlying reason for the
defense of entrapment."' 142 This passage was particularly important to
the development of the outrageous government conduct defense because
it expressed a belief that the law should recognize a defense distinct from
the one espoused in Sorrells v. United States 143 and reaffirmed by the
Sherman majority. 1" The statement did not enumerate the "underlying
reason for the defense of entrapment," but articulated the notion that
examination of government investigative conduct should not end with a
Sorrells-type analysis. 45 Although the concurring opinion in Sherman
did not propose a specific new legal doctrine, it did suggest that existing
law was inadequate. 14  The concurrence held that "[no] matter what the
defendant's past record and present inclinations to criminality, or the
depths to which he has sunk in the estimation of society, certain police
conduct to ensnare him into further crime is not to be tolerated by an
advanced society."'47 The above passage illuminates a desire to move
away from a narrow interpretation of Rochin and toward what would
eventually become the outrageous government conduct defense. The re-
minder that "certain police conduct to ensnare [a suspect] into further
crime is not to be tolerated by an advanced society"' 45 sounds less like
Rochin's narrow holding149 and more like the Rochin Court's statement
that "convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend 'a
sense of justice.' "I" By deeming even predisposed defendants worthy of
protection from certain government investigative conduct, 5' the Sher-
man concurrence set the stage for the eventual creation of a doctrine
designed to protect precisely those defendants. It is ironic that a concur-
ring opinion contributed more to the development of the outrageous con-
141. Id. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
142. Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
143. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
144. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372.
145. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441-43. See also supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the entrapment defense as applied in Sorrells.
146. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382-83 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
147. Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
148. Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
149. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 174 (violation of due process where police entered defendant's
home and forcibly pumped his stomach to obtain evidence).
150. Id. at 173 (quoting Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 287, 285-86 (1936)).
151. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382-83 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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duct defense than did a majority opinion that, but for its limiting
language, would have been the defense's prototype.
C. United States v. Russell
The Supreme Court in United States v. Russell 152 established a place
in federal criminal proceedings for the legacy of Rochin v. California 53
and of the concurring opinion in Sherman v. United States."4 The Rus-
sell Court recognized the outrageous government conduct defense, in
that "a majority of the Court accept[ed] the notion that there may well
be some circumstances in which a due process defense would be available
even to a defendant found to be predisposed."' 55
In Russell, the government initiated an undercover investigation of
defendant Russell and various co-defendants, believing that they were
running an illegal methamphetamine-manufacturing laboratory."5 6 Orig-
inally, an undercover federal narcotics agent went to Russell's home, and
told Russell and the co-defendants that he represented an "organization"
which aspired to control methamphetamine manufacture and distribu-
tion in the Pacific Northwest.15 7 The agent offered to supply phenyl-2-
propanone (P2P), a necessary ingredient of methamphetamine, to the de-
fendants on the condition that he be shown the laboratory and given a
methamphetamine sample. 5 8 The defendants agreed, made two batches
of methamphetamine using all of the government-supplied P2P and sold
one batch to the agent.' 59 Approximately one month later, the defend-
ants were arrested and charged with manufacture and sale of
methamphetamine. 6 °
At trial, Russell unsuccessfully raised the defense of entrapment.
16 1
The Ninth Circuit heard his appeal and reversed his conviction, but on
grounds separate from Russell's entrapment defense.' 62 The court held
that the conviction was unconstitutionally obtained through "an intoler-
able degree of governmental participation in the criminal enterprise." 163
152. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
153. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
154. 356 U.S. 369, 379 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
155. W. LAFAVE & A. ScOrr, supra note 79, § 5.2(g), at 431 (emphasis in original).
156. Russell, 411 U.S. at 425-26.
157. Id. at 425.
158. Id. at 425-26. The agent demanded that he be given one-half of any methamphetmaine
supply the defendants produced. Id
159. Id. at 425.
160. Id. at 424.
161. United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671, 672 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
162. Id. at 673.
163. Id.
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The government appealed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and re-
versed the court of appeals, thereby affirming Russell's conviction.'"
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that
the agent's "involvement in the manufacture of the methamphetamine
was so high that a criminal prosecution for the drug's manufacture [vio-
lated] the fundamental principles of due process." 165
Russell based the "overinvolvement" argument on the theory that
since P2P was an extremely scarce material, nearly impossible to obtain,
the crime could not have taken place but for the government's supplying
the chemical. 16 6 The Court disagreed for two reasons. First, it rejected
Russell's contention that P2P was tremendously scarce, pointing out that
supplies of the ingredient could not be so short if the defendants' labora-
tory contained, as the agent testified, bottles labeled "phenyl-2-propa-
none." 167 Second, the Court asserted that eradication of difficult-to-
expose criminal operations depended on law enforcement agents' infil-
trating and supplying valuable ingredients or implements to the opera-
tions' participants.' 6 The Court concluded that "the infiltration of drug
rings and a limited participation in their unlawful... practices"' 169 did
not constitute law enforcement tactics violative of "'fundamental fair-
ness, shocking to the universal sense of justice' [and therefore impermis-
sible under] the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."' 70 The
Court held that while a due process-based defense might be available to
some defendants in the future, it was not available to Russell. 7' The
Court stated: "While we may some day be presented with a situation in
which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due
process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking
judicial processes to obtain a conviction ... the instant case is distinctly
not of that breed."'
72
In order to fully understand Russell's implications for the outra-
geous government conduct defense, it is important to examine what the
Russell Court did not say, as well as what it did say. For example, the
Court recognized the outrageous government conduct defense, and said
164. Russell, 411 U.S. at 424-25.
165. Id. at 430.
166. Id. at 431. However, additional bottles not supplied by the government were found
during a subsequent search of the laboratory. Id
167. Id.
168. Id. at 432.
169. Id.
170. Id (quoting Kinsella v. United States ex rel Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960)).




it was not available to Russell,17 3 but the Court did not elaborate as to
the circumstances under which the defense would be available to a de-
fendant. Also, the Court acknowledged that certain government investi-
gative conduct would violate due process"7 4 and stated that the agent's
conduct in Russell did not.1 75 However, the Court did not indicate what
sort of conduct would be "so outrageous" as to preclude prosecution, on
due process grounds. In addition, the Court announced that because of
the difficulty in detecting and gathering evidence against drug rings, such
criminal operations were subject to undercover infiltration, and suspects
could be, if necessary, supplied with items valuable to the criminal activ-
ity. 76 It is not clear, however, whether the Court intended to allow such
practices in investigations of all criminal operations that are difficult to
detect and eradicate. Thus, the Russell Court's incomplete analysis gave
federal courts little guidance for determining the applicability of the out-
rageous government conduct defense.
It is unclear what analysis the Court wanted lower courts to adopt
in assessing an outrageous government conduct defense. Russell, how-
ever, does suggest two possible analytical approaches lower courts could
take in detecting outrageous government conduct. They are the "factual
precedent" and the "sliding scale" approaches.
Under the first analysis, a lower court would compare the facts of a
new case to those of previous cases in which the outrageous government
conduct defense was or was not applicable. Through comparison, the
court could decide whether the government conduct presently at issue
violated due process. This approach can be gleaned from the Russell
Court's conclusion that government conduct would in some circum-
stances violate due process.1 77 Although the Court did not explicitly
state that factual comparison was the proper means of analysis, this is
effectively how the Court analyzed the situation in Russell.1 78 Presuma-
bly, the Court would approve of lower courts taking a similar approach.
The second type of analysis that could be used in assessing a defend-




176. Id. at 432. The Court referred to gathering evidence against drug rings as an "all but
impossible task." Id
177. Id. at 431-32.
178. The Court did not compare past cases to Russell's. Its comparison took the form of a
prediction; in dictum, the Court stated that "while we may some day be presented with a
situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process
principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a
conviction, the instant case is distinctly not of that breed." Id.
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enforcement needs and due process rights on a sliding scale: the more
illicit, or serious, or difficult to detect the criminal activity under investi-
gation is, the greater society's and the courts' need to allow the govern-
ment to increase its repertoire of investigative techniques, and the fewer
the number of investigative techniques would violate due process. The
Russell Court used this sliding scale approach when it discussed Russell's
case as pertaining to investigations of drug rings. 179 The Court noted the
inherent difficulties faced by law enforcement agencies in breaking up
drug rings, s0 and the concomitant necessity of allowing the govern-
ment's "infiltration of drug rings and limited participation in their un-
lawful... practices."'' The Court then evaluated the constitutionality
of such tactics, concluding that the tactics did not violate due process. 1
82
It is crucial to observe that the Russell Court treated the constitu-
tionality of the government's conduct as linked to the conduct's neces-
sity. I" 3 By deciding whether the conduct was necessary, and then
deciding whether it was constitutional, the Court seemed to allow the
degree of necessity to dictate whether the conduct violated due pro-
cess. 184 In other words, the Court reasoned that the conduct was neces-
sary, and that therefore, there was no violation of due process. l5 This
approach by the Court compels the conclusion that the Russell Court
intended to give the outrageous government conduct defense room to
grow, but not too much room.'8 6 Logic suggests that this approach need
not be confined to cases involving drug rings. On the contrary, since the
sliding scale approach evaluates the constitutionality of government con-
duct in the context of law enforcement needs, and because those needs
change and grow with new types of crime, the sliding scale approach
could potentially apply to any case.
The problem with utilizing a sliding scale approach is that it poten-
tially weakens the outrageous government conduct defense. The govern-
ment could argue that the investigative tactic in question is "necessary,"
and seek to eliminate judicial determinations that the tactic is unconstitu-
tional." 7 Ultimately, Russell was a two-sided coin: It established the
179. Id.
180. Id. at 432. The Court also discussed the problems faced by law enforcement agencies
in obtaining evidence of the rings' "past unlawful conduct." Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. The Court expressed concern that a government agent "will not be taken into the






outrageous government conduct defense on one side,"' 8 but on the other,
its sliding scale approach forced the due process clause to take a back
seat to changing law enforcement priorities.
D. Hampton v. United States
Hampton v. United States,189 the most recent Supreme Court case
regarding the outrageous government conduct defense, was decided three
years after United States v. Russell.190 In Hampton, Hutton, an inform-
ant for the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and de-
fendant Hampton met in a pool hall.191 The defendant's version of the
initial contact was that he noticed needle marks on Hutton's arms and
told Hutton of his (Hampton's) cash shortage.192 According to Hamp-
ton, Hutton then proposed that the two earn money quickly by obtaining
imitation heroin and fooling users into buying it for the higher price of
real heroin.193 On the same issue, the government contended that the
defendant approached Hutton, said he was short on cash, told Hutton of
a heroin source, and that Hutton, at the defendant's suggestion, agreed to
contact a buyer. 194
Despite these discrepancies, there was no dispute as to the next
events. After the initial encounter, Hutton arranged a meeting between
the defendant and two DEA agents. 195 The agents were to pose as buy-
ers of heroin. 196 Before the meeting with the agents, Hutton supplied
Hampton with a sample of real heroin. 197 At the meeting, Hampton pro-
duced the sample and sold it to the agents.198 One agent arranged a buy
for the next day, and the defendant arrived for the second buy, resup-
plied by Hutton.199 At the second buying meeting, the agent agreed to
purchase the drug.2" Just before execution of the sale, other agents
188. Id. at 431-32.
189. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
190. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
191. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 485-86.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 486-87.
194. Id. at 485-86.
195. Id. at 486.
196. Id.
197. Id. The agents tested the purity of the heroin, and negotiated a price for its purchase.
Hutton supplied Hampton with real heroin, the scheme being that Hampton would present
prospective buyers with real heroin, and when long-term buying arrangements had been made,
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moved in and arrested Hampton." 1
At trial, Hampton requested a jury instruction that if the jury found
that Hutton had supplied him with the heroin, the defendant must be
acquitted.2 "2 The court denied the request, and Hampton was convicted
for distribution of heroin.2 °3 On appeal, he argued that due process pre-
cluded his prosecution.2 °4 A plurality of the Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction,20 5 holding that Hampton's due process rights had not been
violated by the government supplying the heroin.20 6
The plurality, for several reasons, held that Hampton could not in-
voke the outrageous government conduct defense.2" 7 First, the plurality
believed that Hampton was interpreting Russell too broadly.208 The plu-
rality reasoned that Russell had not been intended "to give the federal
judiciary a 'chancellor's foot' veto over law enforcement practices of
which it did not approve. '209  Second, the plurality asserted that
although "the Government... played a more significant role in enabling
petitioner to sell contraband . . . than [the government] did in Rus-
sell,"' 210 the due process argument did not apply because the difference
between Hampton's case and Russell's was "one of degree, not of
kind."2  The third reason for the plurality's disagreement with the de-
fendant's due process argument was its belief that due process notions
"come into play only when the Government activity in question violates
some protected right of the defendant." '212 The plurality held that since
the government's conduct did not violate any of Hampton's specific fed-
eral constitutional rights, he could not raise the constitutionally rooted
challenge.213
One segment of the plurality opinion met with strong disapproval
from concurring and dissenting Justices alike.214 The plurality con-
cluded that defendant Hampton could not invoke the outrageous govern-
201. Id.
202. Id. at 488.
203. Id. at 485, 488.
204. Id. at 489.
205. Id. at 485. Justice Rehnquist wrote the plurality opinion, in which Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justice White joined. Id. Justices Powell and Blackmun concurred. Id. at 491. Jus-
tices Brennan, Stewart and Marshall dissented. Id. at 495.
206. Id. at 490-91.
207. Id. at 489.
208. Id. at 490.
209. Id. (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973)).
210. Id. at 489.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 490 (emphasis in original).
213. Id. at 490-91.
214. Id. at 492-95 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 495-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ment conduct defense, because with respect to the conduct of
government agents, entrapment was the only defense available to defend-
ants.215 In effect, the plurality held that only non-predisposed defendants
could claim a defense based on governmental conduct. In contrast, con-
curring Justices Powell and Blackmun,216 and dissenting Justices Bren-
nan, Stewart and Marshall2 17 insisted that Russell permitted even a
predisposed defendant to assert the outrageous government conduct de-
fense, and that this aspect of Russell endured.21 8 Thus, a majority of the
Hampton Court would hold that even predisposed defendants are enti-
tled to assert the outrageous government conduct defense.219
Despite the diversity of opinions in Hampton, the case yielded two
undisputed implications for the outrageous government conduct defense.
First, it further narrowed the variety of situations in which the defense
might be honored: Russell prohibited application of the defense where
the government merely supplied a valuable item to the criminal enter-
prise,22° and Hampton prohibited the defense's application where the
government supplied the very contraband upon which a subsequent in-
dictment was based.22" ' Second, the Hampton decision strongly indicated
the Supreme Court's disfavor of liberal application of the outrageous
government conduct defense.2 As previously noted, the Hampton ma-
jority seemed eager to devise arguments to prevent a defendant from
challenging government investigative conduct on due process grounds.223
Thus, Supreme Court jurisprudence on outrageous government con-
duct, from Rochin v. California2 24 to Hampton v. United States,225 re-
flects the Court's initial desire to establish the defense, and the Court's
215. Id. at 490.
216. Id. at 491 (Powell, J., concurring).
217. Id. at 495 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 493 (Powell, J., concurring) ("I am unwilling to conclude that an analysis other
than one limited to predisposition would never be appropriate under due process principles.");
id. at 497 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Russell does not foreclose imposition of a bar to convic-
tion based upon.., due process principles... even though the individuals entitled to invoke
such a defense might be 'predisposed'.").
219. Id. at 490. The Ninth Circuit has not adopted this aspect of the Hampton plurality
opinion. United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. United States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v.
Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 962 (1982) ("The due
process outrageous government conduct defense survived the Court's review in Hampton.")).
220. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 425-26 (1973).
221. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 485, 489-91.
222. Id. at 488-91 (citing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973)).
223. Id. See also supra notes 214-19 and accompanying text.
224. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
225. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
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subsequent deep regret over having done so. By 1976, the Supreme
Court had left open only "a most narrow... due process channel." '226
The Ninth Circuit picked up where the Supreme Court left off, and as the
following discussion shows, has narrowed the channel even more.
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE OUTRAGEOUS GOVERNMENT
CONDUCT DEFENSE
To what level must the government's conduct rise to be considered
"outrageous" and therefore unconstitutional? The Ninth Circuit has
sought to answer this question by evaluating whether the conduct is "so
grossly shocking as to violate the universal sense of justice. 22 7 The
court has held that under a few specific sets of circumstances, the govern-
ment's conduct will automatically be held unconstitutional, and the
court will honor the outrageous government conduct defense.228 How-
ever, the better part of the court's efforts have involved deciding what
does not constitute outrageous conduct. The court has undertaken to
eliminate most government conduct from a "list" of possible violations of
due process. 229 As a result, very few types of conduct currently fit within
226. United States v. Ryan, 548 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 965
(1977).
227. United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v.
Ryan, 548 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 965 (1977)).
228. See United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1436 (9th Cir.), (citing Greene v. United
States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971) ("TIhe outrageous government conduct defense [succeeds
where] the government essentially manufactured the crime."), and Huguez v. United States,
406 F.2d 366, 381 (9th Cir. 1968) ("[E]xtreme cases of police brutality [do not] define the
limits of unconstitutionally outrageous governmental conduct.")), vacated on other grounds
sub nom. United States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Ramirez,
710 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v. Ryan, 548 F.2d 782 (9th Cir
1976), cert denied, 430 U.S. 965 (1977) ("Prosecution is barred ... when the government's
conduct is so grossly shocking and so outrageous as to violate the universal sense ofjustice.' ").
229. See United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1987) (no outrageous conduct
where prostitute-informant became sexually and emotionally involved with defendant for five
months in order to lead defendant to FBI), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 233 (1988); United States v.
Tavelman, 650 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 1981) (no outrageous conduct where government photo-
graphed informant with imitation cocaine, put informant in touch with middlemen, and had
informant encourage defendants to travel interstate to inspect and purchase merchandise),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.) (en bane) (no
outrageous conduct where police officer bribed defendant's five-year-old child into pointing out
parent's drug cache), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 903 (1980); United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548
F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1977) (no outrageous conduct where informant threatened to kill defend-
ant's friends unless defendant carried out proposed crime), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978) ;
United States v. Ryan, 548 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1976) (no outrageous conduct where govern-
ment recruited informant by: (1) foretelling, as consequences of refusing to assist government,
a lengthy prison sentence and serious health problems, and; (2) admonishing the informant not
to retain legal counsel), cert denied, 430 U.S. 965 (1977).
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the court's narrow definition of "outrageousness."
The Ninth Circuit cases involving per se unconstitutional govern-
ment conduct were decided prior to United States v. Russell230 and
Hampton v. United States.231 The first of these cases was Huguez v.
United States.z32 In that case, officers obtained the evidence used to try
the defendant on drug smuggling charges by forcibly searching the de-
fendant's rectal cavity.133 Customs agents stripped the defendant, hand-
cuffed him, threw him on a table, applied pressure to his head, shoulders
and back, and forcibly spread his legs to allow a government physician to
probe the defendant's rectum.2 34 The Ninth Circuit dismissed the indict-
ment, holding that: (1) the search was unreasonable under the fourth
amendment; and (2) violated the defendant's fifth amendment due pro-
cess rights. 235 The Ninth Circuit has interpreted Huguez as establishing
that "extreme cases of police brutality" cannot, because of due process
requirements, result in conviction.236
Three years later, in Greene v. United States,237 the court reversed
convictions for bootlegging and conspiracy on grounds that the govern-
ment's investigative conduct violated due process .23 In Greene, an un-
dercover government agent contacted the defendants, posed as a gangster
interested in distributing illegally distilled whiskey, supplied a still, a
place of operation, an operator, sugar and containers, and was the sole
purchaser of the whiskey over a period of three and one-half years.
2 39
The Ninth Circuit held that the governmental activity rendered the con-
viction "repugnant to American criminal justice."'z" Greene is seen as
having set forth the rule that due process standards preclude prosecution
or conviction where "the government essentially manufactured the
230. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
231. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
232. 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968).
233. Id. at 367.
234. Id. at 372-73.
235. Id. at 382. The fourth amendment to the Constitution governs searches and seizures
by the government, and provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
236. United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1436 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. United States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1986). Bogart involved interstate real
estate fraud. Id, at 1429-30.
237. 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971).
238. Id. at 787.
239. Id. at 784-86.
240. Id. at 787.
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orle,,241crime."4
Aside from those two cases, the Ninth Circuit has not added any
other types of government conduct to the list of unconstitutional investi-
gative behavior. In fact, the court recently summed up the various gov-
ernment conduct that will not be considered violative of a defendant's
due process rights.242 In United States v. Bonanno,24 3 the Ninth Circuit
held that the outrageous government conduct defense is not available
where:
(1) the defendant was already involved in a continuing series of
similar crimes, or the charged criminal enterprise was already
in progress at the time the government's agent became
involved;
(2) the agent's participation was not necessary to enable the
defendants to continue the criminal activity;
(3) the agent used artifice and strategem to ferret out criminal
activity;
(4) the agent infiltrated a criminal organization; and2'
(5) the agent approached persons already contemplating or en-
gaged in criminal activity.
2 41
Although the instances in which the Ninth Circuit will honor the
outrageous government conduct defense are very few indeed, the court
continues to find that the defense is still viable.246 The court has also
stated that the list of outrageous conduct is not exclusive; the court has
held that "extreme cases of police brutality [do not] define the limits of
... outrageous government conduct."247
241. Bogart, 783 F.2d at 1436 (citing Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir.
1971)).
242. United States v. Bonanno, 852 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1988).
243. Id.
244. In light of the court's previous cases, the Ninth Circuit's test should be read in the
disjunctive, despite the court's using the word "and" here. In the past, the court has not
insisted that all of the types of government conduct listed in Bonanno occur simultaneously, to
preclude application of the outrageous government conduct defense. For example, the Ninth
Circuit barred application of the defense in Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d at 1341. In that case, the
government informant did not infiltrate a criminal organization, but in effect "used artifice and
strategem to ferret out criminal activity," by leading the defendants to believe that they could
work with the informant to develop a heroin-smuggling ring. Id. at 1331.
245. Id. at 437 (citing United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1437-38 (9th Cir.), vacated
on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1986).
246. United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
233 (1988) ("Our circuit has continued to entertain complaints by defendants that their outra-
geous treatment by law enforcement officers warrants dismissal of their indictment.").
247. Bogart, 783 F.2d at 1436.
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A. A Gap Between Promise and Judicial Performance
Unfortunately, these statements by the court appear empty in light
of several other Ninth Circuit cases. Since the early 1970s, the court has
at times wrongfully rejected claims of outrageous government con-
duct. 248 In these cases, the conduct at issue either clearly violated due
process, according to Ninth Circuit precepts, or should have been and
was not added to the court's list of what constitutes illegal behavior on
the part of government agents.
1. A case in which the Ninth Circuit should have considered the
conduct outrageous, according to its own precepts
The Ninth Circuit has firmly stated that it will find a due process
violation and honor the outrageous government conduct defense if "the
government essentially manufactured the crime."" This section dem-
onstrates that the court has not always stayed true to its word.2 50 It is
helpful to briefly examine two cases in which the government conduct
was not conclusively "manufacturing," and to compare them with a case
in which the government clearly manufactured the criminal activity.
a. defendant-initiated criminal activity
In United States v. So,251 "the creative inspiration for the charged
crimes was provided by [the defendants]. 2 52 In So, the Internal Reve-
nue Service (IRS) was investigating the manager and associates of a bank
on suspicion of money laundering.253 The IRS first suspected criminal
activity when the bank branch manager failed to fie deposit reports as
248. See United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1987) (no outrageous conduct
where prostitute-informant became sexually and emotionally involved with defendant for five
months in order to lead defendant to FBI), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 233 (1988); United States v.
Tavelman, 655 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 1981) (no outrageous conduct where government designed
and facilitated initiation of interstate heroin dealing scheme), cert denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982);
United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.) (en bane) (no outrageous conduct where police
officer bribed defendant's five-year-old child into revealing whereabouts of parent's suspected
drug cache), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 903 (1980); United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329
(9th Cir. 1977) (no outrageous conduct where informant threatened to kill defendant's friends,
in order to ensure defendant's continued participation in criminal scheme), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 926 (1978).
249. United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1436 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds sub
nom United States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (1986) (citing Greene v. United States, 454
F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971)).
250. See infra notes 381-98 and accompanying text.
251. 755 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1985).
252. Id. at 1353.
253. Id. at 1352.
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required by the Currency Reporting Act.254 The government sent an in-
formant, who posed as someone interested in setting up a money launder-
ing operation, to meet with the manager. 255  At the manager's
suggestion, the parties formed a fictitious corporation to launder what
would be, unknown to the manager, IRS-supplied money.25 6 After meet
ing with defendant So in Hong Kong, undercover IRS agents followed
So's intricate deposit instructions and supplied $545,390 to the operation
in just two weeks.257
Following trial and conviction, So appealed and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. 25 8 The court of appeals, on the basis of the manager's sug-
gesting money laundering and So's formulating the deposit plan, rejected
So's contention that the government had manufactured the criminal ac-
tivity.25 9 The facts of the case tied initiation of the criminal enterprise to
the defendants.2 60 The situation therefore did not warrant application of
the outrageous government conduct defense.2 6'
In other situations, though, the court has not found it as easy to
determine whether the government manufactured the crime. In United
States v. Wylie,2 62 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the defendants' convictions
of manufacturing and distributing LSD, and rejected their claim that the
government's conduct violated due process.263 In Wylie, informant
Bloch, a friend of one of the defendants, told DEA agents of the defend-
ants' scheme to make and sell LSD.2 4 In late November, 1978, a de-
fendant met with undercover DEA agents, who agreed to supply him
with a necessary chemical and who asked to be paid in LSD. 261 By De-
cember 1, 1978, this defendant had sold the agents 30,400 LSD tablets.2 "
The DEA, though, presumably hoping to charge multiple felonies, 267
delayed arresting the seller and the other defendants until January 18,
1979.268 During this one-and-one-half-month period, the agents continu-
254. Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5322 (Supp. 1988)).
255. Id. at 1353.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1352.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1353-54.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. 625 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
263. Id. at 1374.
264. Id.
265. Id. The suspect indicated his desire to produce up to one kilogram of LSD per month.
Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1377.
268. Id. at 1375.
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ally supplied the essential ingredient for LSD, and the defendants manu-
factured and sold the government 282,400 more LSD tablets.269 In
appealing their convictions, the defendants argued that the government's
suggesting payment in the form of LSD constituted outrageous con-
duct.270 The defendants claimed that but for the government's offer, they
would not have sold the drug to the agents.27 1
The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendants' claim, characterizing the
government's conduct as "good, solid undercover investigative work.
'272
Examination of Wylie does not conclusively establish that the govern-
ment initiated the criminal enterprise. However, the government's urg-
ing that it be paid in LSD 273 cuts against the proposition that the agents'
conduct was wholly non-initiatory.
b. government-initiated criminal activity: United States v. Tavelman
United States v. Tavelman 27 provides an example of government-
initiated criminal activity. Tavelman arose from a DEA investigation of
suspected Los Angeles narcotics distributors. 27 Baron, a Douglas
County, Nevada, jail inmate, contacted a DEA agent and offered to assist
the agent in undercover operations against the suspected distributors.276
The DEA retained him as an informant, and Baron went to Los Angeles,
where the DEA began the operation at issue in Tavelman 7 Hoping to
attract narcotics distributors, the DEA photographed Baron, portraying
him with large bags of what was supposed to be cocaine.278
During the days that followed, Baron, playing the role of a cocaine
supplier, met various middlemen.279 Silverman was one of these middle-
men. Silverman attempted to convince his friend, Job, to buy Baron's
cocaine.280 Job was reluctant at first, but after a visit from Baron, said he
would bring a friend, Tavelman, the defendant, from Los Angeles to
Reno, Nevada, to inspect the cocaine and put down a deposit toward its
269. IaM at 1374-75.
270. Id. at 1377.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1377-78.
273. Id.
274. 650 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982).
275. Id. at 1135.
276. Id. The opinion says nothing about how the informant knew to contact the DEA
agent. It is not clear, from the Ninth Circuit's opinion, whether the informant knew of any
specific operations in progress, or whether the agents had previously dealt with the informant.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. The opinion does not discuss how the informant knew to contact these middlemen.
280. Id. at 1135-36.
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purchase.28' When Job and Tavelman arrived in Reno, Baron showed
them the (imitation) cocaine, and the two suspects produced half of the
282 Bpurchase money. After Baron, Job and Tavelman split up, DEA
agents arrested Job and Tavelman separately. 28 3
Both defendants were convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine
with intent to distribute284 and of violations of the Travel Act.28 On
appeal, their due process-based contention was that the government
"originat[ed], conceptualiz[ed], and engineer[ed] the entire plan, ' 286
which violated their due process rights. The Ninth Circuit disagreed,287
holding that "although the record provides a basis for defendants' argu-
ment..., the conduct complained of here does not reach that extreme
area in which it is 'outrageous' or 'grossly shocking.' "288 The court's
due process analysis stopped there.
28 9
The defendants' argument, however, did not warrant such speedy
dismissal. It is difficult to imagine what constitutes "originating, concep-
tualizing, and engineering the entire plan' 290 if the government's conduct
in Tavelman did not. The cocaine-selling scheme was the government's
idea; the DEA and its informant decided to move on narcotics distribu-
tors.291 Also, photographing the informant with several bags of what
was supposedly part of a supply of "very good cocaine ' 292 would, by
most accounts, amount to "conceptualizing, ' 293 not to mention initiat-
ing, the criminal activity. Finally, sending the informant into the field to
locate middlemen and potential customers, then arranging for the sus-
pects' interstate travel to inspect the merchandise, seems like "engineer-
ing the entire plan. 294 It is also odd that although "the record
provide[d] a basis for the defendants' argument, ' 295 they did not pre-
281. Id. at 1136.
282. Id. Baron produced $24,000. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1135 (21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1976)).
285. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (1976).
286. Tavelman, 650 F.2d at 1139-40.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1140 (quoting United States v. McQuin, 612 F.2d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir.), cert
denied, 445 U.S. 955 (1980) and United States v. Smith, 538 F.2d 1359, 1361-62 (9th Cir.
1976)).
289. Id. at 1139-40.
290. Id. at 1139.
291. Id. at 1135.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1139.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1140.
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vail.2 96 The court should not have deemed the argument meritorious and
then allowed the government to prevail.297 The facts indicate a strong
basis for the defendants' claim of outrageous government conduct.298
The government's conduct was not nearly as limited to participation as it
was in So, 299 and the conduct was more clearly initiatory than that in
Wylie. 3"' The court failed to adequately explain its opinion. 01 In the
final analysis, United States v. Tavelman was wrongly decided.
2. Additional instances of governmental conduct that the Ninth
Circuit should have considered outrageous
a. United States v. Penn
In United States v. Penn,3 °2 Seattle police, armed with a state search
warrant, went to the defendant's home hoping to seize evidence of a her-
oin distribution ring.303 The defendant, her children and others were
suspected of running the ring.3" For thirty minutes, officers searched for
the quantities of heroin believed to be on the premises.30 5 Then, one of-
ficer, escorting the defendant's five-year-old child, Reggie, to the bath-
room, asked Reggie if he knew the heroin's location, and Reggie nodded
affirmatively.3 0 6 A few minutes later, the officer asked Reggie to lead
him to the heroin.307 Reggie hesitated, so the officer offered Reggie five
dollars, and Reggie led the officer to the home's backyard and pointed to
the grass.308 The police began digging, and within minutes, found 132.9
grams of heroin.3 9 By the end of the afternoon, the police had recovered
14.6 additional grams without Reggie's help.310
296. Id. at 1139.
297. Id.
298. See also infra notes 370-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the merits of the
defendants' claims.
299. So, 755 F.2d at 1352-53. See also supra notes 251-61 and accompanying text for a full
discussion of So.
300. Wylie, 625 F.2d at 1374-75. See also infra notes 356-67 and accompanying text for a
full discussion of Wylie.
301. Tavelman, 650 F.2d at 1139-40. The court's cursory discussion merely announced the
holding in the case. Id The bulk of the opinion was devoted to issues other than whether
there was outrageous government conduct. Id at 1135-39, 1140-41.
302. 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 903 (1980).
303. Id. at 878.
304. Id. at 878-79.




309. Id. This quantity of heroin had been stored in ajar. Id. The officer had asked Reggie
if he knew the location of any heroin balloons. Id
310. Id.
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A state judge granted the defendant's motion to suppress the evi-
dence and dismissed the case.311 Soon thereafter, the federal government
brought charges against the defendant for possession of a controlled sub-
stance with intent to distribute.312 The defendant successfully asked the
federal district court to suppress the evidence on the ground that the
government's conduct in bribing Reggie violated the defendant's due pro-
cess rights.313 The government appealed the order to the Ninth
Circuit. 3 14
The court of appeals reversed the district court's order.315 It dis-
agreed with the district court's position that "the bribery of a child of
tender age by a policeman in order to obtain evidence to be used against a
parent represents police conduct which is shocking to the conscience and
is... so violative of the decencies of civilized conduct to be a deprivation
of due process. ' ' 3 16 The court of appeals decided that due process had
not been violated since: (1) the government broke no law; (2) society had
a compelling interest in curtailing heroin dealing; (3) this type of incident
appeared to be an isolated one whose frequent recurrence was not likely;
and (4) given the defendant's practice of enlisting her children's help in
the heroin ring, the government's intrusion into the "circle of family con-
fidence" '317 did not shock the conscience.318
The circuit court also chided the district court for what the higher
court saw as an attempt to use the outrageous government conduct de-
fense as a panacea for questionable law enforcement conduct. 31 9 The
court emphasized that government conduct offensive to "a judge's every
notion of what is morally best" was not sufficient justification for grant-
ing a due process remedy.320 The Ninth Circuit conceded that it "disap-
prove[d] of the police tactic used. ' 321  However, even if the court's
reason for expressing dissatisfaction was to alert the government to ongo-
ing constitutional concerns, the result gave the government the choice of
whether or not to listen.
311. Id.
312. Id (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Supp. 1988)).
313. Id. at 879.
314. Id.
315. Id at 885.
316. Id. at 879 (citing memorandum issued by district court).
317. Idt at 882.






b. United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa
In United States v. Reynoso- Uloa,322 the Ninth Circuit held that the
United States Constitution allows an undercover government informant
to rekindle a criminal suspect's enthusiasm for carrying out a proposed
crime by threatening to kill the suspect's friends.323
In Reynoso-UlIoa, the defendant met the government's informant,
Sheen, in California.324 Sheen had formerly worked as an informant for
the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and had relocated
to California to escape threats on his life.325 After conversations in
which Sheen and the defendant discussed the possibility of smuggling
heroin into the United States from Mexico, Sheen called the Seattle DEA
agents for whom he had worked.326 At the agents' request, Sheen contin-
ued meeting with the defendant, while the Seattle agents helped develop
an undercover scheme for Sheen.327 As the scheme progressed, Sheen
and the defendant traveled interstate to meet with the agents, and the
suspect sold small amounts of heroin to the agents.32 8 The group also
developed plans for ongoing, larger operations.329 Upon a prearranged
heroin delivery in Los Angeles, DEA agents arrested Reynoso-Ulloa.33 °
The defendant was subsequently convicted of distribution of heroin,
possession with intent to distribute,331 conspiracy, and for use of the tele-
phone to facilitate the conspiracy.332 One of the defendant's claims on
appeal was that Sheen had threatened him a few days prior to the arrest,
thereby violating the defendant's due process rights.333 Reynoso-Ulloa
alleged that he had been threatened when he told Sheen of his doubts
about making the delivery.334 The defendant contended that Sheen was
upset about Reynoso-Ulloa's having second thoughts, and that Sheen
322. 548 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978).
323. Id at 1341.
324. Id. at 1331.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. Sheen asked the agents if they were interested "in doing a large amount of heroin
in the San Diego and Tijuana areas." Id.
328. Id. at 1332.
329. Id. at 1331-33. The agents posed as Seattle organized crime figures interested in find-
ing a new source of heroin for their distribution operations. Id. at 1331.
330. Id. at 1332 n.5.
331. Id. at 1331.
332. Id. at 1331-32. Reynoso-Ulloa also claimed that he had been entrapped, and that the
trial court's instructions on entrapment were erroneous.
333. Id. at 1328.
334. Id.
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threatened to "do," or kill,3 Reynoso-Ulloa's friends unless the defend-
ant agreed to complete the operation.336
The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's claim of outrageous gov-
erument conduct and affirmed his conviction.337 The court stated that
given the context, the informant's threat to kill the defendant's friends
did not constitute outrageous government conduct. 338 The threat, the
court said, was made in the regular course of "puffing, ' 339 and did not
mark the first time "false claims [or] veiled threats" had been made by
defendants and informants alike. 4° Moreover, the judges cautioned that
such behavior had to be expected from "persons of [the] lowest caliber"
who typically participated in drug trafficking.341
Reynoso-Ulloa is another example of the Ninth Circuit construing
the outrageous government conduct defense too narrowly. The court de-
parted from the Supreme Court's two analytical approaches that the
Supreme Court seems to have suggested in United States v. Russell.
342
The Reynoso-UlIoa court allowed the minute-to-minute tone of an inves-
tigation to govern determination of the conduct's constitutionality. 43
Reynoso-Uloa's implications were twofold: First, the Ninth Circuit con-
doned the government's investigative activities, and thus left open the
possibility that the government could constitutionally behave similarly in
the future; second, the court's examination of the context in which the
challenged government conduct occurred established a new means of
evaluating, and most likely rejecting, future due process claims.344 Ulti-
mately, although the Ninth Circuit noted that it found the government's
"conduct... by no means commendable, 3 45 such conduct will not be
deterred.
335. Id. It was determined at trial that to "do" someone means to kill him or her. Id. at
1328 n.21.
336. Id at 1338. Testifying at trial, Sheen recounted his own words:
I told Alfredo [Reynoso-Ulloa], I said, you know, you mother fucker, they are mak-
ing it, I'm swinging right now. I mean, you know, these people are pissed. My old
man ain't too happy with this whole program and I told him, I said if I'm gonna get
my ass in this much shit, I'm gonna do you cocksuckin fuckin' Mexican friends, and
he said okay, I don't blame you, so he said I'll put you right into it. So he did.
Id n.21 (citing reporter's trial transcript at 320).
337. Id. at 1341.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 1339.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
343. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d at 1339.
344. Id. at 1341.
345. Id. at 1339.
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c. United States v. Simpson
In United States v. Simpson,3 46 the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed an ear-
lier holding347 that "there was no due process violation when.., a paid
informant had sex with her suspect." '348 Simpson involved a Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation (FBI) probe of defendant Simpson's suspected her-
oin dealing.349 The FBI hired Helen Miller, a known prostitute, heroin
addict and fugitive from Canadian drug charges, as an informant. 5 0
One day, as the defendant was leaving the Los Angeles International Air-
port, Miller and a female friend posed as "stranded travelers"3 ' and
Simpson drove them into the city.3" 2 Miller and the defendant soon be-
gan a sexual relationship.353 This relationship lasted approximately five
months.354 Eventually, Miller took Simpson to meet her "friends" inter-
ested in buying heroin; the "friends" were undercover FBI agents. 355
The agents arrested the defendant after executing a drug deal,3 6 and the
government indicted him on drug charges.357 He moved for suppression
of wiretap evidence, 3 8 and for dismissal of the indictment on grounds of
outrageous government investigative conduct. 359  The district court
granted both motions.31° Upon granting the defendant's motion to dis-
miss, the district court held that, as the Supreme Court in United States
v. Russell had predicted, the "some day" '361 for applying the outrageous
government conduct defense had at last arrived.362 Specifically, the dis-
trict court held that
First, "the government's manipulation of Helen Miller into be-
coming an informant," second, "the Government's continued
346. 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 233 (1988).
347. United States v. Prairie, 572 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1978).
348. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1467 (citing United States v. Prairie, 572 F.2d 1316 (1978)).
349. Id. at 1464.
350. Id.
351. Id. The female friend was also a government informant. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 1465.
355. Id. at 1464.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id. The FBI had electronically surveilled Simpson's telephone conversations. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1464 (citing district court's reliance on Russell's reservation that
a court "may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement
agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from
invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction .... " Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32)).
362. Id.
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employment of Miller despite her known status as a heroin ad-
dict and prostitute, and despite her numerous arrests," and
third, "the Government's continued use of Miller as an inform-
ant after learning of her sexual involvement with .
Simpson"
363
forced the court to dismiss the indictment and thereby deny the govern-
ment "'the fruits of its heinous acts.' ,364 The government appealed the
order, and the Ninth Circuit reinstated the indictment.365 The court re-
jected the district court's conclusion that "the Government cannot be
permitted to stoop to these depths to investigate suspected criminal
offenders.
' 366
A study of Simpson suggests that the district court was incorrectly
reversed. The Ninth Circuit justified, on several grounds, the govern-
ment's allowing Miller to remain an informant despite her ongoing sex-
ual relationship with Simpson.367 First, the circuit court reasoned that
Simpson was distinguishable from cases in which the defendant was in
some way "physically or psychologically coerced. ' 36' Here, the court
said, Simpson did not suffer this kind of abusive inducement. 369 On the
contrary, "he seem[ed] ... quite willing to become sexually and emotion-
ally involved with [Miller]. 370 Second, the court rejected the argument
that Miller's use of sex amounted to outrageous conduct. 371 The court
observed that "to win a suspect's confidence, an informant must make
overtures of trust and must enjoy a great deal of freedom in deciding how
best to establish a rapport with the suspect. ' 372 Third, the circuit court
understood the FBI's needs in the situation. The operation's success, the
court knew, depended on Miller's eventually leading the defendant to the
agents.373 The court of appeals held that it would be unreasonable to
punish the government for allowing the operation to continue un-
checked.374 The court acknowledged that such judicial action would
363. Id. (quoting district court's findings).
364. Id. (quoting district court's findings).
365. Id.
366. Id. (quoting district court's findings).
367. Id. at 1467-68. "At some point, the FBI became aware of Miller's sexual involvement
with Simpson... [and] deliberately closed its eyes to Miller's ongoing conduct." Id. (citing
reporter's transcript at 47).




372. Id. The court theorized that an informant "might perceive a need to establish a physi-
cal as well as emotional bond with the suspect." Id




amount to "requiring the FBI to pull out just as an informant's efforts
[were] coming to fruition.
'375
Simpson seems to be a case in which the Ninth Circuit simply
wanted to allow the prosecution to continue, and therefore did not find a
due process violation. The Ninth Circuit's opinion followed a district
court finding of outrageous government conduct.376 The district court's
finding was reached after an eight-day evidentiary hearing. 377 The dis-
trict court relied on the "oft-quoted dictum ' 37 in Russell to support its
finding;379 the Ninth Circuit relied on the same language to foreclose
application of the due process-based defense.38
3. Understanding current Ninth Circuit case law
It is important to ponder why the Ninth Circuit did not find the
government's investigative conduct outrageous in Tavelman,as1 Penn,38 2
Reynoso-Ulloa3 3 and Simpson.384 First, did the court take a particular
analytical approach to evaluating the constitutionality of government in-
vestigative conduct? Was its legal reasoning similar to the Supreme
Court's in United States v. Russell 3 5 -did it decide on the basis of fac-
tual precedent or law enforcement necessities? Or, did the court take a
different approach? Second, could there be hidden, underlying reasons,
apart from legal analysis, why the Ninth Circuit decided as it did?
The Ninth Circuit has used variations of both analytical approaches
suggested in Russell,386 and in other cases has constructed its own analy-
375. Id. The court did not fault Miller for "engag[ing] in sexual activity on her own initia-
tive." Id.
376. Id. at 1464.
377. Id.
378. Id The "oft-quoted dictum" referred to is the Supreme Court's statement in Russell
that a court "may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforce-
ment agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government
from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction." Id. (citing United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973)).
379. Id
380. Id. at 1464-65.
381. United States v. Tavelman, 650 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939
(1982).
382. United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 449 U.S. 903
(1980).
383. United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
926 (1978).
384. United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 233
(1988).
385. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
386. Id, For a discussion of these approaches, see supra notes 177-88 and accompanying
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sis. For example, in United States v. Ryan,38 7 the court held that the
government's conduct in that case was not, "measured against the Rus-
sell standard," violative of due process.388 However, the Ninth Circuit
did not use Russell's "factual precedent" approach 389 to distinguish
Ryan's facts from those of other cases in which the government violated
due process. Instead, the court merely stated that a standard existed,
and without articulating the standard, insisted that it did not bear on the
present case.390 On occasion, the court has also used the "sliding scale"
approach.391 The court used this approach in United States v. Penn.392
There, one of the court's reasons for upholding an officer's bribery of the
defendant's child was that effective operations against drug dealing re-
quired the use of such tactics. 393 In United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa,
394
the court used a different approach,395 holding that the governmental
conduct's constitutionality should be evaluated within the context of a
specific undercover operation.
396
Understanding how these approaches work explains why the Ninth
Circuit so seldom finds due process violations. As previously noted,397
the "sliding scale" analysis is fairly open-ended, in the sense that it coun-
tenances continual deference to the government. The Reynoso-Ulloa
method of exploring due process issues in the context of the individual
investigation similarly emphasizes allowing the government to complete
its operations.398 In so doing, the approach trivializes constitutional con-
cerns. Both of these approaches virtually dictate denial of a defendant's
motion, and thus their use limits, and effectively bars, application of the
outrageous government conduct defense.
Why does the Ninth Circuit use these approaches if, one after the
other, the approaches disfavor defendants? The court may regard law
enforcement investigations so highly that it is willing to rubberstamp vir-
tually any form of undercover government activity. Or, the judges might
fear that tying the government's investigative hands in the slightest de-
gree is tantamount to feeding America to criminals. Another reason
387. 548 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 965 (1977).
388. Id. at 788 (citing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973)).
389. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
390. Ryan, 548 F.2d at 788.
391. Iad; see also supra notes 179-88 and accompanying text.
392. 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 903 (1980).
393. Id. at 881. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
394. 548 F.2d 1329, 1339 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978).
395. Id. at 1339. See supra notes 337-38 and accompanying text.
396. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d at 1339.
397. See supra notes 179-88 and accompanying text.
398. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d at 1139.
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might be concern that any attempt on the court's part to enforce the
defense will be struck down by the Supreme Court. Speculation aside,
the fact remains that today, the Ninth Circuit sanctions virtually unlim-
ited investigative power of government law enforcement agencies, at the
expense of suspects' due process rights.
V. PROPOSAL
A. How the Court Could Implement Change
This Comment proposes broader recognition of the outrageous gov-
ernment conduct defense by the Ninth Circuit. The court must rigor-
ously enforce existing doctrine, deem additional types of government
conduct unconstitutional, and should approach all outrageous govern-
ment conduct claims with renewed zeal toward upholding due process
protections.
First, where the government conduct at issue in a case clearly vio-
lates the Ninth Circuit's previously promulgated due process stan-
dards,3 99 the court should honor the outrageous government conduct
defense. Thus, where the government "essentially manufacture[s] the
crime, ' '4 ° the Ninth Circuit should nullify the prosecution or reverse the
conviction, on due process grounds.401
Second, the court should widen the range of government conduct
considered unconstitutional. In this way, the court would give substance
to its promise that "extreme cases of police brutality [do not] define the
limits of... outrageous government conduct.""4  For example, to avoid
399. See United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1436 (9th Cir.) (citing Greene v. United
States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971) ("[The outrageous government conduct defense...
[succeeds where] the government essentially manufactured the crime"), Huguez v. United
States, 406 F.2d 366, 381 (9th Cir. 1968) ("[E]xtreme cases of police brutality [do not] define
the limits of unconstitutionally outrageous governmental conduct.")), vacated on other grounds
sub nor. United States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (1986); United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d
535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v. Ryan, 548 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1976) ("Prose-
cution is barred... 'when the government's conduct is so grossly shocking and so outrageous
as to violate the universal sense of justice' "), cert denied, 430 U.S. 965 (1977)).
400. United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1436 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. United States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Greene v. United States,
454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971)).
401. United States v. Tavelman, 650 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939
(1982), is a case where the government initiated the criminal activity. Id. at 1140. However,
the Ninth Circuit in that case did not honor the outrageous government conduct defense. Id
The Tavelman decision should, in the interests of due process rights, be viewed as an anamoly,
and the preexisting standard, discussed supra notes 237-41 and accompanying text, should
continue to be the rule.
402. Bogart, 783 F.2d at 1436.
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a recurrence of the situation in United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 403 the
court should declare the government's conduct unconstitutional if the
government, as a means of ensuring suspects' participation in criminal
activity, threatens suspects or others with violence. Also, to prevent rep-
etition of the problem in United States v. Simpson,4' the court should
honor a claim of outrageous government conduct where the informant's
conduct, had it been performed by a government officer rather than the
informant, would have been disapproved by the government agency.
The court should similarly scrutinize the methods by which govern-
ment agencies recruit informants, and honor the outrageous government
conduct defense where an officer's conduct in soliciting a person to be an
informant does not comport with standard agency practice. Thus, scena-
rios like that in United States v. Penn"o would be avoided. Policy con-
siderations support the court's implementing these changes: (1)
government agencies would be forced to better control their informants;
(2) defendants' due process rights would be better protected; and (3) the
court would enhance its credibility and integrity.
Another consideration is that each time the Ninth Circuit errone-
ously rejects a defendant's outrageous government conduct claim, it ef-
fectively condones the government conduct that precipitated the claim.
For example, in United States v. Simpson," 6 the court rejected the de-
fendant's argument that the government engaged in outrageous conduct
by allowing a five-month sexual and emotional involvement between
Simpson and an informant." 7 The court did not expressly approve of
the government's methods in the case, but its decision sent a strong
message that such methods were constitutionally permissible and could
be used again.
One consequence, then, of so seldom honoring the outrageous gov-
ernment conduct defense is that more types of questionable government
403. 548 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978). In that case, a gov-
ernment informant threatened to kill the defendant's friends, in order to ensure the defendant's
continued participation in the criminal scheme. Id. at 1338 n.21. See supra notes 322-45 and
accompanying text for a full discussion of Reynoso-Ulloa.
404. 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 233 (1988). In Simpson, the
informant-prostitute was sexually and emotionally involved with the defendant, as part of the
government's investigation, for a period of five months. Id. at 1465. See supra notes 346-80
and accompanying text for a full discussion of Simpson.
405. 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 903 (1980). In Penn, a police
officer bribed the defendant's five-year-old child to gain information as to the whereabouts of a
suspected drug supply. Id at 879. See supra notes 302-21 for a full discussion of Penn.
406. 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 233 (1988); see also supra notes
346-80 and accompanying text for a full discussion of Simpson.
407. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1465.
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conduct are permitted, and fewer types of seemingly egregious behavior
are contestable. Over time, as the due process means of attack becomes
largely unavailable, persons subject to intensive government investigation
lose a significant measure of constitutional protection. Furthermore, as
law enforcement agencies acquire greater investigative power over sus-
pected criminal offenders, every person in the Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction
enjoys less freedom. Law-abiding persons might not be the targets of
undercover operations, but they still must live in a society over which the
government's police power casts an ever-growing shadow.
The Ninth Circuit might envision certain obstacles to implementing
the suggested changes to its approach. First, it might view a request to
more broadly apply the defense as a demand that the court wholly reject
years of precedent. This Comment's proposal is not nearly so radical a
suggestion. The Ninth Circuit is not asked to embrace an entirely new
rule, but only to apply a moderate revision of the existing one. The court
should adopt additional criteria for applying the defense, partly in order
to lend credibility to the court's assurances that the defense still exists."°
Second, the Ninth Circuit still might hesitate for fear that the
Supreme Court will reverse any lower court decision to honor the de-
fense. The Ninth Circuit recognizes the Supreme Court's intention that
the outrageous government conduct defense be very narrowly applied.4 9
The court understandably wants to avoid frequent reversal of its deci-
sions. However, the court should not overcautiously assume that the
Supreme Court will frown upon any deviation from present practice.
The logical projection is that the more abusive the government's conduct,
the lower the risk of reversal. In such cases, the Ninth Circuit should
take a risk and enforce the defense.
B. Remedial Legislation
Remedial legislation is an additional means of ensuring the outra-
geous government conduct defense's broader application. The defense is
rooted in notions of due process, 410 and presently, the decision whether
408. See id. ("Our circuit has continued to entertain complaints by defendants that their
outrageous treatment by law enforcement officers warrants dismissal of their indictment.").
409. United States v. Ryan, 548 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, Zeldin v. United
States, 430 U.S. 965 (1977). The Ryan court said that "the due process channel which [the
Supreme Court in] Russell kept open is a most narrow one." Id. at 789 (citing United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973)).
410. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973). The "standard" required to
honor the defense is whether "the conduct of law enforcement agents [was] so outrageous that
due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes
to obtain a conviction." Id.
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to honor it involves discretionary application of a judicially created stan-
dard. Remedial legislation could provide for the defense's broader appli-
cation, by requiring the courts to honor the defense in specific situations,
and entrust the courts with discretion, in favor of application, in scena-
rios not listed in the statute. This legislative scheme is desirable, because
it would guarantee the defense's application in some cases, and en-
courage it in others. While courts would still have discretion in certain
instances, a congressional directive that the outrageous government con-
duct defense be meaningfully honored could reduce the risk of overly
narrow judicial interpretation. Fashioned in this manner, national reme-
dial legislation would go far in setting limits on acceptable government
law enforcement conduct. Legislation could also address the persistent
problem of judicial inattention to due process concerns in the context of
undercover investigations.
Narrow application of the outrageous government conduct defense
need not equal what appears to be, over time, virtual non-enforcement of
an important standard in constitutional criminal procedure. As this
Comment's proposal demonstrates, the Ninth Circuit may remedy the
present law's shortcomings while still adhering, in form and in spirit, to
the Supreme Court's mandate that the outrageous government conduct
defense be narrowly applied.411 In addition, Congress can design effec-
tive remedial legislation. The federal judicial and legislative branches
should take these constructive steps.
VI. CONCLUSION
Former Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark once warned courts of
the danger of "grant[ing] [a] right but in reality ... withhold[ing] its
privilege and enjoyment." '412 To this Author, the Ninth Circuit is guilty
of this regarding the outrageous government conduct defense. However,
a reasonable alternative to the present situation exists. The Ninth Circuit
should apply the outrageous government conduct defense more broadly.
Congress should also step in and enact legislation to guarantee this. The
law in this area will be more settled, the protection of the criminally
411. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 79, § 5.2, at 431 (interpreting the Russell and
Hampton decisions as establishing that "instances of government conduct outrageous enough
to violate due process will be exceedingly rare").
412. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (Clark, J.).
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suspect against the government will be stronger, and a potential threat to
public liberty will move farther and farther from our midst.
Stephen A. Meister*
* This Comment is dedicated with love to my family. The Author would also like to
thank Professors Marcy Strauss and Charlotte Goldberg for their assistance. This Comment is
also dedicated to Scott Alan Hampton, and to the memory of Dean Thunick Hoffman.
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